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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
SECTIONS 7 & 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was involved in an automobile
accident in North Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah,
on the 14th day of November, 1959; and as a result
of said accident, Floyd James was critica'lly injured
and died a few hours later in a Salt Lake Hospital.
During the same evening defendant was arrested
and 'taken to a Justice of the Peace, E. S. Arbuckle,
who issued a commitment lodging the defendant in
the Davis County Jail, on a charge of drunk driving.
On the 17th day of November, 1959, a complaint
was filed against the defendant, charging him wi'th
the crime of automobile homicide, in violation of
Section 76-30-7.4 Utah Code Annotated (1953), to
which charge a plea of "not guilty" was entered;
and preliminary hearing was set for December 16,
1959. Following the preliminary hearing, the defendant was bound over to stand trial in the District
Court of Davis County.
The information upon which the defendant was
charged read in part as fo'llows:
"That the defendant, Paul L. Nelson,
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, did willfully, unlawfully, and felloniously drive an automobile in a reckless and negligent manner upon U. S. Highway 91 in
North Salt Lake, Davis County, State of Utah,
and did collide with an automobile driven by
2
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Floyd James, resulting in the death of the
said Floyd James."
A trial on the issues was held before the Honol·able Charles D. Cowley on Wednesday, April 20
and 21, 1960, following which a jury returned a
vel'dict of Guilty as Charged in 'the Information.
The defendant appealed to this Court.
Since the proceedings and conduct of the State's
Officers during the investigation is questioned, a
rather detailed examination of the transcript wil1
follow.
The evidence shows that on November 14, 1959,
a't approximately 7:45 P.M., the defendant was proceeding north on Highway 91. As he approached the
semaphore-controlled intersection of Highway 91
with Cudahy Lane, which lane intersects Highway
91 in an east-westerly direction (See Plaintiff's
Exhibit P), a 1950 Dodge automobile, owned and
operated by a Mr. William Jackson, was in the process of making a left turn from Cudahy Lane, wes'terly and south onto Highway 91. The defendant's
automobile struck the left rear of the Jackson automobile and then proceeded through the intersection
and co'llided with a Chevrolet automobile driven by
the deceased, Floyd James, as the James automobile
was attempting to cross U. S. highway 91 from
the west. ( T. 14, 15). The testimony is conflicting
as to whether at the time of the collission, the sema1
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phore showed amber or red for north and southbound traffic on U. S. Highway 91 and green for
east and westbound traffic on Cudahy Lane.
(T. 15). However, there is also testimony that the
activated 'time device which controlled 'the semaphore
had not been working properly prior to the accident. ( T. 133, 144).
State's witness, Lester A. Blackner, testified
that, following the accident, he noticed "that the
smell of alcohol was on his (defendant's) breath,"
and that he "felt" that defendant was intoxicated
(T. 35, 36). However, Beth Jackson, a passenger in
the 1950 Dodge automobile driven by her husband,
who observed defendant while she was seated in a
police officer's automobile with him, said that, although she detected a smell of alcohol coming from
the front seat, where Mr. Nelson was seated, (T. 58),
she was unable to determine whether the defendant
was intoxica:ted. (T. 58). Similarly, Mr. William
Jackson expressed no opinion as to Mr. Nelson's
alleged intoxication; and in fact, testified that, in
his conversations with him, he experienced no difficulty in understanding the defendant and that his
words were clear. ( T. 65) .
Mr. Kent Francis, a chemist for the State of
Utah, testified of his receiving and testing a urine
samp'le which was taken from the defendant. The
urinalysis conducted for the purpose of determining
1
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the amount of alcohol in the urine, was the subject
of detailed examination. (T. 67, 68, & 69). The analysis showed that the urine sample contained .259
per cent ethyl alcohol. Through the use of a mathematical equation, Mr. Francis was permitted to
testify, over defendant's objection, that the defendant's blood contained .184 per cent ethyl alcohol.
(T. 68, 69). Mr. Francis admitted under cross examination that there was considerable variance in
the conclusions to be drawn from alcohol-urine analyses, depending upon the specific gravity of the
urine tested, the time, and amount of consumption.
He did not profess to know or take these factors
into consideration. (T. 71, 73-75). This witness did
not profess 'to know or testify concerning the effect
of the determined amount, or of any amount of
blood alcohol upon the bodily functions of any person or upon the defendant.
Mr. Deveraux, a part-time ambulance driver,
took Mr. James to the St. Mark's Hospital. While
th~re, he witnessed a conversation be'tween Trooper
Schmidt and Mr. Nelson. A portion of Mr. Devereaux's testimony follows: ( T. 80).
"A. Trooper Schmidt asked if he would
submit to a blood test, ·and he said that he
didn't know enough about what this test would
do to him, and he would just as soon not give
it.
Q. And then what?
5
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A. And then the Trooper said, ' - well,
this man was quite concerned about Mr.
James' condition, and he said, 'If he dies,
what will this blood test do for me?' and
Trooper Schmidt said, 'It may help you in
court, and it may harm you.' He said, 'I
wouldn't want to say.' And he said he had
just as soon not submi't 'to 'the blood test if
he didn't have to.
Q. And then what?
A. We just stood there for probably 30
minutes and just listened to them back and
forth while we were waiting for the car."
Although Mr. Devereaux stated that he had
smelled an alcoholic odor coming from the corner
where the defendant was sitting and expressed his
opinion that the defendant was under the influence
of intoxicants, ( T. 81) he further explained on cross
examination that defendant's conduct indicated
symptoms of shock; and that, if he hadn't smelled
alcohoil, he didn't know what his opinion would have
been.
Mr. Warren Haddenham, who drives an ambulance for the South Davis Firemen's Association,
indicated that he saw defendant at St. Mark's Hospital. He testified concerning a conversation between Trooper Schmidt and Mr. Nelson regarding a
blood-alcohol test.
"A. And then the conversation went to
Mr. Schmidt on this blood-alcohol test.
Q. What did the defendant say?
6
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A. He didn't know what he wanted. He
wanted to know what the blood test was. He
didn't quite u n d e r s t a n d what Trooper
Schmidt meant by blood-alcohol test." (T. 87).
Although this witness smelled alcohol on Mr.
Nelson and believed him to be intoxicated, he too
explained that many symptoms observable in defendant were compatible with mild shock, and frankly
admitted that his opinion would have been different had it not been for the smell of alcohol. (T. 91).
Deputy Marshall, C'leon W. Gwynn, of North
Salt Lake City, assisted in the investigation of the
accident and was called as a witness for the State.
He drove Mr. Nelson, in compa11y with others, to
St. Mark's Hospital in Sal't Lake City, where Mr.
James had been 'taken for emergency treatment. Enroute, he observed that defendant appeared sick;
and when asked if he were sick, said that he felt
like "he wan ted to vomit . . . all I want is air."
(T. 105).
The Depu'ty also witnessed a conversation between Trooper Schmidt, a portion of which follows:
1

" . . . and he asked the defendant if he
would sign for a blood-alcoho'l test, and the
defendant then refused, wondering what effect tha;t would have on him in case the person would die .. Gary Schmidt had asked the
defendant if he wouldn't just think 'this over.
That it was for his own good." ( T. 106).
The witness said that Mr. Nelson "did smell
7
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of alcohol" ( T. 106) and, in his opinion, appeared
intoxicated.
Following the episode at the hospital, the witness, in company Wi th the defendant, returned to
the scene of the accident and then accompanied
Marshal Reynolds with the defendant to the home
of Judge E. S. Arbuckle. He testified that Judge
Arbuckle questioned him concerning the amount he
hadhadtodrink. (T.109).
Town Marshal, Roy A. Reynolds, of North Salt
Lake, arrived at 'the scene of the accident at approximately 7:55 P.M. and assisted in interviewing witnesses at the scene of the accident. His interview
with Mr. Nelson included questioning into his activities of the day and:
'' ... I asked him how much he had had to drink.''
(T. 135).
Following 'this conversation, Mr. Nelson was
placed under arrest by Marshal Reynolds, and he
was taken to the home of Justice of the Peace E. S.
Arbuckle for the purpose of obtaini11g a commitment. Of the conversation which passed at the time
the defendant was at the Justice's home, the following is pertinent: ( T. 136).
1

" ... I explained to the Judge at that time
wha't the trouble was, why the defendant was
there. Then he proceeded to talk to the defendant. He asked the defendant where he had
been; he got no answer. He asked him how
8
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much he had had to drink, and the defendant
went in'to the same procedure of from two
to five, he didn't know for sure. He broached
the question of how long the defendant had
been drinking - had been partaking is how
he worded it, I believe . . ."
The Marshal was asked whether he observed
any odors "about the defendant." (T. 136). Hereplied that there was an odor of alcohol. (T. 137).
The Marshal then concluded that 'the defendant
"was definitely drunk." (T. 139). On cross examination, however, the following was read from the
transcript at the preliminary hearing. (T. 140).
Mr. Palmer:
"From th'is experience did you form an
opinion as to the condi'tion tha't Mr. Nelson
was in?
"I learned ·a long time ago not 'to form
opinions.
Q. Did you form an opinion in this case
as to whether or not he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor?
A. I definitely knew that he had been
drinking but I didn't form an opinion until
I got a report from the State Chemist."
"Q. Was that your testimony at the
preliminary hearing, Officer Reynolds?"
A. I believe you are right, yes.''
Marshal Reyndlds also testified that prior to
the time of the accident, they had experienced difficulty with the traffic light. (T. 143, 144). That
9
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'the safety engineer from the State of Utah had
come to make adjustments upon his suggestion.
(T. 145).
Officer Gary Schmidt of the Utah Highway
Pa:trol, as previously indicated, accompanied the
defendant and others to the hospital. The officer
testified that he requested the defendant to submit
to a blood test; but before the hospital technician
would withdraw the blood, it was necessary to ob1tain the defendant's written consent. Mr. Nelson
said that "he did no't want Ito sign it." (T. 167).
During this time, defendant repeatedly expressed
concern for the condition of Mr. James. Mter again
requesting defendant to submit to a blood teSt,
the following conversation occurred:
''. . . I did explain to him that if he refused this blood test, that he could 'lose his
driver's license.
Q. Did he give you a blood test?
A. No. About four times during the
course of the time that we were there, I
asked him for the blood test, and he refused all
four times.
Q. Did you give him any other kind of
test?
A. Yes, I secured a urine sample.
Q. Tell us how you got 'that.
A. About immediately after the lastthe third refusal, I went otlt to my car and
secured a bottle from the trunk of my car
1
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that 'Ye used for that purpose, and brought it
back In, and I asked Mr. Nelson, 'if you don't
want to give us a blood sample, wil'l you give
us a urine sample?' And he readily agreed
t0

•t

1

•

•

•

"

The Officer testified that he smelled an odor
of alcohol about the defendant, and based on this
and his other observations, in his opinion, the defendant was intoxicated. (T. 173).
Judge E. S. Arbuckle, the Jus'tice of the Peace
of North Salt Lake was produced by the State as
a witness. A part of the conversation which he had
with the defendant in his home is as follows:
(T. 180).
". . . and he sat down, and Royal (Marshal Reynolds) told me he had charged him
with drunk driving, and I talked to him Mr. Nelson- and I asked him if he had been
drinking, and he said, 'Yes.' And I asked him
how much, and he said 'two beers, a vodka,
and some whiskey. And then I talked to him
a minute or two and asked him why he was
driving - why was he trying to run a red
light, and I just said to him, 'how many did
you say you had?' and he said, 'I had four
beers, and two or 'three vodkas,' tha;t time.
And he was talking so you could hardly understan·d what he was saying. His speech
was very thick tongued, and you couldn't
hardly understand what he said. And we talked there a while, and we decided that we had
better lock him up for the night until he sobered up, and 'then bring him back so that
he could 'talk so that we could understand
whal he said and he could understand us."
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(T. 181).
Glen Townsend indicated that he arrived at
the scene of the accident shortly after it had occurred
and observed that the defendant was "white." "He
looked like he might be in shock from the ,accident."
( T. 190). He did not notice anything unusual concerning his walk. ( T. 190) .
Similarly, Rosemary Hendrickson, had seen defendant immediately before the accident, and in
fact had followed him from 4500 South State Street
in Salt Lake Ci'ty, to St. Mark's Hospital. (T. 192).
She noticed nothing erratic or unusual about the
way he drove. She talked to Mr. Nelson in the Sheriff's car, following the accident, and indicated that
the defendant didn't have much to say, and observed
ti1at he appeared "pretty worried ... a11d scared."
(T. 194).
Jay Hendrickson testified of his casual acquaintanceship with Mr. Nelson and indicated that
on the day on which the accident occurred, they
drank about three glasses of beer together between
approximately 11:00 o'clock in the morning and
3:30 or 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. (T. 197).
Following this, the defendant accomp,anied the witness to his home, where they each drank a vodka
mixed with orange juice. The witness prepared the
drink and indicated that he had put about an ounce
of vodka in each glass of orange juice. (T. 199).
1
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A large dinner was then eaten by Mr. Nelson and
Mr. Hendrickson, and neither had drunk more alcoholic beverage. Mr. Nelson left his home a't 7:15
P.M., and at that time Mr. Nelson was not intoxicated. (T. 199). He explained that Mr. Nelson's
"slow 'Oakie' walk" was normal, as was his speech.
(T. 201).
Mrs. Joan Nelson, wife of the defendant, was
following the defendant in Mrs. Hendrickson's automobile and had followed him from approximately
4500 South State Street in Salt Lake City to St.
Mark's Hospital, where a traffic light separated
them. She next found her husband sitting in a police
car following the accident. She observed the he was
"nervous and upset" (T. 210) but was not under the
influence of alcohol. (T. 211).
The defendant, Paul Nelson, stated that abou't
noon he went to a lounge in Sa'lt Lake City with Jay
Hendrickson and Ted Connors, where "he had about
three beers". ( T. 219) . They then went to Mr.
Hendrickson's house, where he had a drink of vodl<'a
and orange juice. He spent approximately 3lj2 to
4 hours at Mr. Hendrickson's home, where he ate
a large meal and then proceeded to Bountiful. (T.
220, 221). At this time he did not feel the effect of
the beer or the vodka and orange that he had drunk
earlier in the day.
As a result of the accident, he suffered a bruis13
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ed and lacerated knee and a· bump.on his head when
he struck his chin on the steering wheel. (T. 225).
The defendant denied that he had told the officers
or Justice· of.lhe Peace E. S. Arbuckle that he had
drunk whiskey earlier in the day. (T. 229).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION NO. 8.

Defendant requested 'the Court to give the following instruction, identified as Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 8:
"To warrant you in convicting 'the defendant, the evidence must to your minds exclude every reasonable hypothesis dther than
that of the guilt of the defendant; that is to
say, if after a fu'll consideration in comparison of all the evidence in the case, you can
reasonably explain the facts given in evidence
on any reasonable ground other than that of
the guilt of the defendant, you must acquit
him."
The Statute under which the defendant was
charged reads as follows - Utah Code Annotated,
76-30-7.4 ( 1953) :
"Any person, while under the influence
of intoxica'ting liquor ... to a degree which
renders him incapable of safely driving a vehicle, who causes the death of another by operating or driving any automobile ... in a
reckless, negligent, or care'less manner, or
14
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'Yith a wanton or reckless disregard of humah
life or safety, shall be. deemed guilty of a
felony; and upon conviction shall be punished
by imprisonment in the S'tate ·Penitentiary
for a period of ndt less than one. nor more
than ten years.''
The difference between this Statute, the viola>
tion of which constitutes a felony, and Utah Code
Annotated 41-6-43.10, (1953) dealing with negligent homicide, which is a misdemeanor, is that the
person causing the death is intoxicated. Intoxication
while driving is the element which takes the conduct of reckless'ly driving an automobile out of the
misdemeanor classification and makes it a felony.
It becomes extremely important, therefore, to examine with great care the testimony upon which
the defendant was convicted as pertains to his alleged intoxication.
The defendant was admitedly involved in a
serious accident of considerable proportions. Extensive dam'age was done to three automobiles; defendant was shaken up considerably as a result of a
knee and head blow ; and deceased, Floyd James,
received mortat wounds. Although the defendant indica'ted, immediately folllowing the accident, 'that
he did not think he was hurt, it is submitted that
he was not in a position at that time to make such
an appraisal. It is not difficult to understand that,
as some witnesses testified, the defendant was
15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"white" and appeared "upset and scared." He was
worried about the condition of Mr. James, as well
as the possible consequences to himself, which involved :the possible loss of his j'ob, and, of course,
the possible legal consequences of the acciden't. ( T.
225) . The only evidence of intoxication was based
upon the various witnesses' opinions; and in each
such case, an important element of their consideratibn was the smell of a1cohol present. Several witnesses, including some of the State's witnesses, did
not believe the defendant was intoxicated; and some
expressly stated that, although they believed him
to be intoxicated, their opinion would have been
different had the smell of alcohol not been present.
It has previously been established by 'this Court
in the case of Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P. 2d 277,
( 1957), that the smell of alcohol is not sufficient
upon which to sustain a finding of intoxication.
In that case the defendant was found 'lying on the
seat of his car, on which was also an empty bottle,
and he smelled of 'liquor. The Deputy Sheriff observed 'the defendant's eyes to be "rolling," his
speech incoherent, and that he was "kind of throwing his body around.''
The Court determined th'at:
" ... the fact that there was an empty
bottle in the car and 'the smell of liquor are
16
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not sufficient to suport a finding of intoxicatibn."
.
The Court has previously adopted the rule of
law under circumstances such as those present in
this case, where the S'tate relies upon circumstantial
evidence, that the trial court, in order to avoid or
minimize the danger of permitting the jury to speculate upon such evidence, must give a cautionary instruc'tion such as was requested by this defendant.
In the case of State v. Burch, 100 Ut. 414, 115
P. 2d 911 (Utah, 1941) the Court stated, page 912:
"If circumstantia'l evidence is submitted
to a jury, it is accompanied by an instruction
that to convict upon such evidence, tha't evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. That such ·an instruction
is given implies that there is a question for
the jury to decide as to whether or not such
evidence does exclude that hypothesis. But, if
the evidence is such that reasonable men would
n'ot differ upon the fact that it includes such
an hypothesis, then it is not a question for
the jury, but is one for the Court."
This rule was followed in the case of State v.
Anderson, 66 Ut. 573, 158 P. 2d 127 ( 1945). See
also the case of State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120
P. 2d 285, 302, where ihe Court in discussing the
question of sufficien·cy of evidence in a conviction
on circumstantial evidence said:
"In order to sustain a conviction, the evidence must be of such persuasive force that
the mind migllt be reasonably satisfied of all
17
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the necessary facts constituting the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and
where the proof of a necessary fact is dependent solely upon circumstantial evidence, such
circumstances must be such as to reasonably
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other
'than the existence of such fact and be
consistent with its existence and inconsistent with its nonexistence. It is not necessary that each circumstance in itself establish the guiit of the defendant, but the whole
chain of circumstances, taken together, must
produce the required proof."
The wisdom of this rule, as it should have been
app'lied in the case at bar, is apparent. The sole
evidence concerning the intoxicated condition of the
defendant was based on circumstantial evidence,
consisting primarily of the smell of alcohol coming
from the presence of the defendant, and observations of his demeanor.
Reviewing the testimony in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence of intoxication is
conflicting. Testimony from witnesses of both the
State and the defendant indicated that he was not
under the influence of intoxicants. Mr. Nelson's conduct following the accident was shown to be consistent with symptoms of shock. Certainly the evidence on this crucial point was not so conclusive
as to exclude every "reasonable hypothesis of innocence.''
Considerable time was spent at the trial with the
testimony of Mr. Francis, the State Chemist, who
18
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had analyzed a urine sample taken from the defendant. The nature and effect of this testimony will
be separate~y treated in another section of this Brief.
But even considering his testimony most favorably
for the S'tate, there was no evidence tending to shlow
the effect that any amount of alcohol would have
upon the defendant. This important consideration
was left to the unbridled speculation of the jury.
Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's conduct folllowing the accident was just
as consistent wi'th defendant's innocence as with his
guilt. Where the Sta'te based :the strength of 'the
case upon the intoxicated condi'tion of the defendant,
the evidence of which was wholly circumstantial, the
failure of the Court to give the requested cautionary
instruction consti'tuted reversible error.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PALPABLE
ERROR IN FAILING TO CHARGE THE JURY TO
DISREGARD THE ENTIRE TESTIMONY OF H. KENT
FRANCIS, STATE CHEMIST, WHIOH FAILURE CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.

As observed above, the State was required to
prove the defendant's intoxication as an essential
element of its case. In an a'ttemp't to sustain this
burden, the State eal'led as a witness H. Kent Francis\ a chemist for the State of Utah, who had conducted an analysis of a sample of urine taken from
the defendant. His analysis in the sample of urine
resulted in determining that there was .259 7o
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ethyl alcohdl in the s a m p l e of urine tested
(T. 68,) and that by multip_lying said figure
by .72 he arrived at the figure of .184 per cent
blood-alcohol. (T. 69). Over the objeetion of the defen·dant, he testified concerning the content of alcohol in the blood based upon a determination of the
alcohol content in the urine at various periods of
time following consumption. ( T. 71). He in'dicated
that 'there could be a vari'ance in resu1ts of the urinalysis te8t, depending upon whether the urine tested
had an average specific gravity, light or heavy.
( T. 72) . These factors were not taken into consideration in making tests of defendant's urine sample.
Further, Mr. Francis' test did not take into account
the lapse of time between consumption and time the
sample was taken. He admitted this to be an important factor which could vary the result of the test,
because following absorption the alcohol in the urine
is greater than a blood 'alcohol ·content by approximately one-four'th. (T. 73). The chemist was permitted to testify concerning the relationship between
urine alcohol and blood alcohol generally without
the benefit of knowing the amount of alcohol allegedly consumed by the defendant nor the time in which
it was consumed. Apparently these factors did not
seem 'important either to the chemist or to the State,
although admittedly they would h.ave a bearing upon
the result of the test.
No witness professed to know or state the ef20
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feet which any amount of alcohol found in the body
fluids of the defendant would have upon his ability
to drive 'an automobile.
The District Attorney admitted 'that
" . . . there was no testimony as to 'the
effect upon defendant of the blood alcohol or
alcohol within his urine ... " (T. 259).
The Coutt gave a requested instruction of defendant as follows:
''You are instructed that, though there
is evidence regarding the results of a chemical
test to the defendant's bodily fluids; to wi't,
urine, if 'there is n·o evidence of the effeet of
that percentage or any other percentage of
alcohol in the bl'ood by weight upon the human
being, you must disregard the results of the
chemical test which has been received in evidence."
rt is submitted that 'this instruction did not
correct the error which was committed in permitting
the State to introduce c'onsiderable evidence concerning tests for alcnholic content of defendant's
bodi'ly fluids without testimony showing the effect
of such alleged amounts of alcohol in the blood of
the defendant or of any human being. The jury was
permitted to speculate upon this vital issue when it
was admitted by the State that such effect "had
not been shown''.
In this connection, this Court, in the case of
State v. Cobo, Utah, 90 Ut. 89,60 P. 2d 952, (1936),
discussed the recognized rule that errors with re21
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ference to instructions will not be considered on
appeal unless sufficient exceptions were taken at
trial. A recognized exception to that general rule
exists, however, in "serious" cases when pa'lpable
error on the face of a record occurs which invo~ves
violation of fundamental rights and privileges and
results in manifest prejudice. In such cases the
Supreme Court can, even on its own cognizance,
correct 'the same.
"But in capital cases and in cases of
grave and serious charg·ed offenses and convictions of long terms of imprisonment, cases
involving the life and liberty of the citizen,
we think that when palpable error is made to
appear on the face of the record to the manifest prejudicl of the accused, the Court has
the power to notice such error and to correct
the same, though no formal exception was
taken to the ruling. In these days of widespread advocacy of reform to procedure in
criminal cases to heal and cure misgivings
and faulty prosecutions, the safeguards of
the righ'ts and privileges of the accused shou'ld
not be overlooked and a loose reign held for
the prosecution and a tight, technical, and
restricted reign held on the accused."
The prejudicial nature of the error is enhanced
when viewed in the light of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A.
( 1953, Pocket Supp.). The statute states in part:
"If there was at the time 0.05 per cent
or less by weight of alcohol in defendant's
blood, it shall be presumed that defendant
was not under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.
22
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'' ( 2) If there was a't the time in excess
of 0.05 per cent, but less than 0.15 per cent by
weigh't of alcohol in defendant's blood, such
facts shall not give rise to any presumption
that defendant was or was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact
may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence
of the defendant.
"(3) If there was at the time 0.15 per
cent or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it should be presumed that
defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquors . "

The Court completely failed to give an instruction advising the jury of these presumptions. In view
of the uncertain and prejudicial testimony which
Mr. Francis was permitted to give concerning per
cent of blood alcoho'l, the jury could have concluded
that the defendant's blood alcohol fell below .015
per cent level, or within that area where no persumption of intoxication exists.
The Court's failure to charge the jury that
there was no evidence showing the effect of any
amount of alcohol on any human being, or upon the
defendant, when viewed in light of Section 41-6-44,
U.C.A. (1953), was palpable error of which 'this
Court can take judicial notice even though no formal
exception was made to 'the same.
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POINT III.
THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
SECTIONS 7 & 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

As observed from 'the ear'lier recitation of facts,
the defendant was placed under arrest by Marshal
Reynolds following their return to the scene of the
accident after having been to St. Mark's Hospital
( T. 135). The · defendant was then taken to the
home of the Justice of the Peace to 'talk to Judge
Arbuckle', ( T. 135) , where Marshal Reynolds
" ... explained to the judge ... what 'the
trouble was, why the defendant was there. He
asked him how much he had had to drink, and
the defendant went into the same procedure
of anywhere from two to five ... He broached
the question of how long the defendant had
been drinking . . . I wanted a commitment
to lodge him (defendant) ih the Davis County
Jail ... The judge issued the commitment."
(T. 136).
The record is completely devoid of any reference indicating that either Marshal Reyndlds or
Justice of the Peace Arbuckle advised defendant of
his constitutional right to remain silent. It is interesting to observe that for approximately two
hours, from 8 :00 P.M., when the accident occurred,
until 10:00 P.M., when the defendant was taken
before the Justice of the Peace, defendant had been
in the presence of numerous police officers and a
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magistra'te, and had not on one occasion been advised
that his statements may be used against him, as
ultimately proved to be the fact.
Under 'the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendnlent to the United States Constitution, and Article
I, Sees. 7 & 12 of the Constitution of Utah, an "accused shall not be compelled 'to give evidence agains t
himself''. These safeguards were completely ignored
on this occasion by police officers and the magistrate
insofar as this defendant was concerned.
Further, Section 77-15-1, U.C.A. (1953) requires that when "the defendant is brought before
the magistrate upon an arrest . . . on a charge of
having committed a public offense ... the magistrate must immediately inform him of the charge
against him and of his right to 'the aid of counsel
at every s'tage of th2 prcoeedings."
Rather 'than follow the statutory mandates imposed upon him, the magistrate undertook, albeit
under questioning, to extract admisions from dedendant as to his alleged drinking, and demanded
explanations of asumed facts by asking hin1 "why
he was driving - why was he tring to run a red
Iigh't." ( T. 180).
This Court underscored the necessity of law
enforcement officers presrving these mandates inviolate in the case of State v. Crank, 90 Ut. 89, 142
P. 2d 178, 184 (1943), in the following language:
1

1
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"Article I, Section 12 of the Sta'te Constitution, declares that no personal shall. be
compelled to give evidence against himself.
This applies 'to statements exacted from h'im
outside of Court as well as in Court.''
In the case of State v. Assenberg, 66 U't. 573,
244 P. 1027 (1926), the Court found prejudicial
error in admitting at 'trial statements of defendant
made at an inquest before a Justice of the Peace and
before a formal charge had been made against him.
In granting a new trial, the Court stated: P. 1028:
"He, (defendant) was not cautioned as
to his right to answer questions nor his privilege 'to refuse to testify. Neither was he cautioned that any statement made by him at 'the
time could or might be used against him in
a subsequent prosecution."
See also State v. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200
Pu 2d 723.
The material extent to which defendant was
prejudiced by the Justice of the Peace's failure to
advise h'im of his rights becomes apparent when i't
is realized that the Justice of the Peace appeared at
the 'trial as a State's witness against the defendant.
He appeared not as an impartial arbiter of rights
between the State and defendant, but as an adverse
witness, divulging admissions of defendant and restating irrelevant accus·ations made by himself on
the night of the fatal accident, at a time when defendant remained in an upset and confused condition.
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Instead of providing defendant with the shield of his
constitutional rights, he used the occasion to probe
him with questions, the answers to which he later
used 'to assist in convicting him.
While defendant was at St. Mark's Hospital,
he was requested by Officer Schmidt on four different occasions to submit 'to a blood 'test. The record
indicates that the defendant did not understand 'the
nature or ramifications of 'the test ( T. 80, 87).
The Trooper's only explanation was, "It may help
you in court and it may harm you ... I wouldn't
want to say.'' On another occasion, a'lthough the
conversation between 'the Trooper and defendant
concerning the proposed blood 'test lasted for at leas't
thirty minutes (T. 80),and later a conversation was
had concerning a urine test, 'the defendant was not
once informed 'that he had a right to refuse to submit to either or any test. He was not advised that
'the tests would be used against him if the analysis
proved to be to 'the advantage of the State, but was
told "it was for his own goo'd" ( T. 106). As a matter of fact, when defendant persistently refused to
submit to a blood test, 'the Officer 'tol'd him, if he
didn't go through with it, he could lose his driver's
license.
In the recent case of Ringwood v. State, 8 Ut.
2d 287, 333 P. 2d 943 (1953), the State revoked
the defendant's driver's license for refusing to sub27
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mit to a blood test in accordance with 'the provisions
of Section 41-6-44, 10 U.C.A. (1953, Pocket.Supp.).
The Court reinstated the defendant's license because
the arresting police officer did not properly advise
the defendant that he had the right to choose between a test "of his breath, or of his b'lood, or of
his urine, or his saliva." The Court stated at Page
289 (Utah Reporter) :
"It is realized that after considerable
discussion about the blood 'test, the matter of
a urine test was also mentioned. Mr. Ringwood likewise refused. But the basic fact is
that the officer confronted him with the choice
that he must give his blood for the test, or
his license would be revoked. This was not
in accordance with the requirements of the
statute and there was therefore no proper
basis for revoking his license."
It is aparent from a review of the record that
defendant was not once during the entire proceedings of the evening properly advised of his constitutional rights.
It is no answer to assert that since defendant
submitted to the 'test, the question is moot. The officers had an obligation 'to advise defendant of his
constiutional privileges and to accurately explain
the law as it pertains to tests taken to determine
alcoholic content of bodily fluids. The officers failed
in both responsibilities, and the State should not
now be heard to say that no prejudice resulted to
defendant. The urine test which was taken pro28
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vided a vital part of the testimony concerning the
alleged intoxicated condition of defendant.
In enforcing the laws of 'the State, the police
officers cannot ignore the rights and privileges of
i'ts citizens to their material prejudice and damage.
The failure of the police officers and the Justice of the Peace to advise the defendant concerning
his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant. The defendant made incriminating statements which were subsequently used against him
and deprived him of due process of llaw in violation
of United States and State Constiutions.
1

CONCLUSION
The errors committed by the Trial Court in
the conduct of the case constituted reversible error.
Further, Mr. Nelson was convicled without due
process of law inviolation of both 'the Federal and
State Constitutions.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN
&
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
~4ttorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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